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Since independence in 1991, Tajikistan’s authorities have been trying to 
promote a unifying ideology that could inspire the whole nation. Na-
tional unity is particularly challenging in this country that has been 
wounded by a five-year civil war (1992-1997). As religiosity has be-
come more prevalent over the years, the authorities have tried to 
thwart the growth of Islam by promoting a conservative ideology de-
void of Islamic content, resting on imagined national traditions, nation-
al purity and ancient wisdom. Interestingly, the female figure has be-
come increasingly instrumental in the state’s national discourse. Pat-
ronizing moral recommendations focus mainly on female clothing and 
virtue, which have come to embody national values. The role of women 
in the transmission of family and patriotic values is celebrated, yet dis-
courses hide a difficult reality for Tajik women who are deeply affected 
by poverty, labor migration, and social and state pressure.  
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Channeling Tajik Islam 
 
On the one hand, authorities have tried to instrumentalize religion for legitimacy purposes, 
though its use is carefully limited. Officially, the state is secular, but the special role of the 
Hanafi school of Islam is underlined in the Law on Freedom of Conscience and religious 
Organizations. The year 2009 was dedicated to the Great Imam (Imomi Azam) Abu Hanifa, 
the founder of Hanafism, which is the official religious teaching of Tajikistan.1 An omnipres-
ent figure in Tajikistan, President Emomali Rahmon regularly includes modest references to 
religion in his official addresses to the nation. Every year, presidential speeches congratulate 
citizens at the beginning and end of Ramadan and at the occasion of Idi Fitr and Idi Qurbon. 
In his Presidential inaugural speech in November 2006, Rakhmon underlined the im-
portance of maintaining a secular state, yet swore an oath in the name of Allah and of the 
land. Even so, the Tajik president rarely refers to his own beliefs and does not appear to be 
very religious himself.2 When Islam is evoked, it is presented as an integral part of Tajik 
culture and according to the President: “separating the Islamic faith from the national 
culture […] is a mistake”.3  
 
After some unsuccessful attempts to promote the Aryan and Zoroastrian heritage in the mid-
2000s, the authorities are still looking for an inspiring secular ideology. In the spring 2015, 
at the occasion of his annual meeting with the country’s intelligentsia, the president 
summoned them to develop a secular ideology that takes into account “in priority, the 
principle of secularism, the development of national and secular thinking, respect for state 
language, history, and progressive tendencies of the 
national culture”.4 In this regard, controversial legal 
measures meant to promote national values were 
adopted, such as the Law on Parental Responsibility in 
the Upbringing and Education of Children, introduced in 
2011. It includes provisions on the transmission of “na-
tional values”. In particular, Article 8 invites parents or 
tutors to give children names that have “national con-
sonance”5 and holds parents responsible for raising 
children “in the spirit of the love and respect for the 
Motherland and national values”.  
 
In May 2015, a bill that would forbid the registration of 
names considered too Arabic was being discussed but 
was not yet adopted. If so, registry offices would “not 
register names that are incorrect or alien to the local 
culture, including names denoting objects, flora and 
fauna, as well as names of Arabic origin”.6 Other articles 
of the law are greatly interfering with parenting. For 
instance, parents should forbid children to carry cell 
phones to school, wear jewellery, and let children under 
twenty years old (the legal age is 18) go out at night in entertainment centres such as 
internet cafes and bars.  
 
Example of an official outfit for Tajik imams. 
Source: RFE/RL. 
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On the other hand, authorities have subordinated religion to the point that practices are now 
carefully regulated and the clergy under tight state control. Restrictions concern the 
prohibition of private unsanctioned religious lessons, of children’s participation in religious 
ceremonies at the exception of funerals, and of women’s access to mosques. In the mean-
time, religious education has become inaccessible as most madrassas (religious schools) are 
now closed, with the exception of the Islamic Institute in Dushanbe. Foreign Islamic 
education requires a special permission from the authorities, which have not hesitated to 
repatriate by force nearly 2,000 Tajik students from Islamic countries in 2010. Access to the 
annual Hajj has been limited to citizens over 35 years old. The Department of Religious 
Affairs has increased its influence on religious life by approving the nomination of imams, 
the erection of mosques by preparing a list of approved or suggested topics for Friday 
sermons, and by delivering permits for citizens who wish to organize private religious 
classes. Finally, as of 2014, imams have the obligation to wear state-made religious robes 
and receive their salary from the state.7  
 
More significantly, authorities are trying to channel religious beliefs by establishing religious 
standards and making them compatible with national values. They promote an Islam defined 
as ‘traditional’ and ‘legitimate’, which refers to historical figures in opposition to an Islam 
presented as ‘radical’ and ‘dangerous’ tainted by foreign influences. The process of establish-
ing a national Islam implies the discard of other trends deemed extremist or antagonistic to 
national values. Colonel Zikrullo Saidzoda of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, declared in 
August 2015 that Tajiks must stay away from foreign Islamic trends and that those who do 
not pray according to the principles of the Hanafi branch of Islam could be interrogated.8 
 
A number of Islamic organizations have been added to the list of terrorist organizations and 
over the years, thousands of people have been prosecuted and condemned for their 
involvement in one of the banned organizations. In 2014 alone, Tajikistan’s General 
Prosecutor opened 348 cases on charges of extremism and radicalism or for their support or 
promotion.9 Some of the organizations are known for their violent actions while others such 
as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir may hold fundamentalist views but are non-
violent organizations. The last one added on the list is the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan 
(IRPT), due to its alleged involvement in an assault against a military compound near 
Dushanbe in September 2015. Dozens of IRPT members went into exile and another dozen 
are awaiting trial in Tajikistan. As one of the main stakeholders in the 1997 Peace Agree-
ments, the main opposition force, and the standard bearer of moderate political Islam, the 
ban of the IRPT is of extreme significance.10 Even though Tajik society is not on the verge of 
radicalization, the Islamic Revival Party’s disappearance may jeopardize the stability of the 
country. Finally, the subordination of religion is accompanied by anti-religious propaganda 
that became especially virulent after 2010. What is denigrated is not Islam per se but the 
strict adherence to Islamic principles, especially religious education and clothing.  
 
The reinvention of tradition 
 
In the early years of the Bolshevik revolution, the liberation of women from centuries-old 
patriarchal oppression was a priority for the Soviet authorities. The promotion of women’s 
rights had two objectives: to ensure the equality of rights for men and women, but perhaps 
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even more importantly, to undermine the Islamic clergy and religious traditions. The forced 
unveiling of women, called Hujum, literally, the ‘assault’, provoked serious backlashes but in 
the end, coercion and propaganda provided results and in the last days of the USSR, barely 
any Central Asian women, at the exception of elderly ones, were covering their heads. A very 
similar dynamic is at play in today’s Tajikistan.11 Once again, the female apparel, and more 
broadly, the female figure, embody the secular and progressive character of the nation and is 
used to delegitimize strict religious practices. Yet, if women are accused of propagating 
extremist ideas if they wear a hijab, they are also criticized for dressing up in European 
‘sexy’ clothes that betray national values. To a lesser extent, men’s appearance, especially the 
beard, also falls under state scrutiny. Such recurrent patronizing state discourses are used to 
define and impose a proper behavior in line with an idealized conception of a secular society. 
The issue of concordance between morality and national traditions not only tells us about 
Tajik politics, it also exemplifies the difficulties of nation-building in post-Soviet countries. 
 
Though they are still a minority, the number of women who wear hijabs in Tajikistan is 
increasing year after year and this has become a matter of concern for the authorities. 
Several public figures have publicly criticized women’s clothing style, either ‘Islamic’ or 
‘European’.  In 2007, Abdudjabbor Rakhmonov, the Minister of Education (2005-2012), 
introduced a decree that forbids women to wear hijabs in educational institutions. The 
decree also compels young women to dress “in accordance with their status and national 
traditions”, and avoid clothes that are “provocative”, for instance tight jeans and miniskirts.12 
Attacks against the hijab reached a new level in the fall of 2010, when Rakhmonov publicly 
condemned parents who send their children to study with mullahs as well as women who 
wear the hijab, going as far as to call these women “monkeys”.13 When he became Rector of 
the Pedagogical University in Dushanbe in 2012, Rakhmonov issued a decree instructing 
female future professors to wear high heels (maximum height of 3 cm) so that they look 
more professional and feel more confident.14 Even the Council of Ulemas, Tajikistan’s quasi 
official clergy, recommended women to wear Islamic clothes that conform to the national 
culture, and not those of Iran, Turkey, and other Arabic countries.15 In the spring 2015, it 
was reported that a number of prostitutes wear hijabs in order to avoid public or police 
harassment.16 The story was picked up by the authorities, and used to delegitimize the veil 
once again. In August 2015, Mahmadsaid Ubaidulloev, Dushanbe’s Mayor, declared war 
against foreign clothing and even instructed relevant state bodies to put an end to the import 
and sale of foreign clothing in Dushanbe.17  
 
In August 2015, even Colonel Zikrullo Saidzoda of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, felt 
compelled to criticize women for wearing “European-style clothes”, and suggested them to 
wear “traditional clothes”.18 In May, the mayor of Khujand in northern Tajikistan announced 
the organization of a series of meetings with women to discuss ways to dress properly, in 
accordance to national traditions. He also underlined the need to conduct raids in clothing 
stores in order to prevent the selling of Afghan and Iranian clothes.19 The President himself 
has associated the hijab to extremist ideas in a recent speech delivered at the occasion of 
Mother’s Day in 2015. The President condemned women who wore foreign clothing, saying 
that they were propagating extremist ideas in the country.  
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Although the President maintains that ethnographic studies prove how since ancient times, 
Tajik people always had beautiful female clothes and that women and girls never wore black 
clothes, the definition of what represents ‘tradition’ is problematic. What the authorities 
refer to as a ‘traditional or national clothes’ is a colorful outfit composed of baggy pants 
worn underneath a long loose dress with short or long sleeves. Yet, before the Bolshevik 
revolution, women living in the sedentary regions of Central Asia such as present-day 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan used to wear burqa-like robes called paranja or chavchan that 
covered the whole body including the face until the Soviets launched the Hujum campaign in 
the late 1920s. Therefore, the ‘traditional clothes’ politicians refer to are in fact Soviet 
clothes. The use of pre-colonial legacies requires a distortion of history that authorities are 
willing to make so that it fits the nationalist secular programme they are promoting.  
 
 
Samarkand, 1910. Traditional/Pre-Soviet clothes? 
Source:  Sergei M. Prokudin-Gorskii Collection at the Library of Congress 
 
 
Khujand 2011.Traditional/Soviet clothes? 
Source: Photo credit Hélène Thibault 
 
 
In return, men’s clothes are never evoked. In Tajikistan, most men dress in regular shirts, 
pants, jackets and ties, which do not seem to betray national traditions despite their 
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‘European’ origin. Yet, over the years, there have been many reports concerning police 
harassment toward bearded men, and even reports of some being forced to shave their 
beard.20 In 2009, the Council of Ulemas even established a norm for the length of beards, 
which should not exceed the length of a fist.21 
 
Dressing-up has become a patriotic affair in Tajikistan. In addition to their appearance, 
women’s virtue should also incarnate patriotic values and participate to state-building. In his 
speech at the occasion of Mother’s Day in May 2015, Rahmon labelled mothers as guardians 
of the mother tongue and talked at length about the sanctity of women, and how maternal 
authority fosters the future builders of the state and society. In the authorities’ point of view, 
women bear a lot of responsibilities, both domestic and public. However, they are exercised 
in less than ultimate conditions as the country’s socio-economic situation remains highly 
problematic.  
 
Women under pressure 
 
Labor migration in Central Asia is a phenomenon of extreme significance, especially for 
Tajikistan. According to the Russian Federal Migration Service, as of January 2015, there 
were 999,169 migrants from Tajikistan residing in Russia, including 182,262 women.22 In 
2014, 41% of the Tajik GDP came from the revenues of migrant workers, making Tajikistan 
one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world.23 Labor migration introduces 
new social dynamics within Tajikistan. In the absence of men, women are compelled to play 
more important roles as they become the families’ and sometimes communities’ main pillars. 
Labor migration also has an impact on the structure of the family due to the increasing 
number of divorces. In Sunni Islam, men can divorce their wives by saying “Talaq” three 
times and many migrants end up divorcing over the phone while in Russia. In April 2011, the 
Council of Ulemas of Tajikistan announced its intention to issue a fatwa that would ban so-
called SMS-divorces24. In 2013 alone, more than 1,700 women sought help from the 
Committee on Women and Family Affairs and the Council of Ulemas to resolve such 
litigations. Yet, in January 2014, the Council announced that it could not stop the phenome-
non and concluded that it was not contrary to Sharia.25 Alone with children, without money, 
and with few economic opportunities, women sometimes have no choice but to become a 
man’s second or third wife. This might be one of the factors that encourage the rise of 
polygamy in Tajikistan, even if it is illegal.  
 
The evolving structure of the Tajik family model is perhaps one of the reasons why the 
government designated 2015 the Year of the Family and planned on adopting a series of 
measures to support families. The President also announced that a new topic, “culture of 
family life,” was in preparation and would be introduced in schools to prepare the youth to 
adult life. The government has also adopted a law that outlaws consanguineous marriages 
since it was reported that there are 26,430 disabled children in Tajikistan and 35% of these 
were born in consanguineous marriages.26 
  
Whereas millions of Tajik men endure the burden of labor migration, Tajik women suffer 
pressure at multiple levels: state, social and economic. Poverty is widespread and touches 
around 47% of the population. Access to quality healthcare and education is limited and 
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affects the healthy development of communities. In winter time, citizens in rural areas have 
access to only three to four hours of electricity a day, which greatly reduces the quality of 
life. What is especially alarming is the rapid increase of suicide rates, especially among 
young women. The national suicide rate in Tajikistan among the youth (15-19 years old) 
increased 63% from 2.8 to 4.5 (per 100,000) between 2008 and 2010. Female suicide rates 
increased 176%, from 1.9 to 5.2 (per 100,000), while males experienced only a 6% increase, 
from 3.6 to 3.9. In 2011, more than 200 women committed suicide in the northern province 
of Sughd alone, which has a population of around 2.2 million. The reasons cited are poverty, 
lack of life perspectives and domestic violence.27  
 
A survey conducted in 2012 reported that 25% of women in Sughd had suffered from 
violence perpetrated by their spouse while only 12% reported such cases in the central 
region called District under Republican Subordination.28 The actual numbers might be 
higher since domestic violence is often perpetrated by in-laws. The government passed a 
Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence in 2013 that might encourage women to 
denounce abuses and change the widespread perception that domestic violence is somehow 
acceptable. Finally, another sign of distress is the exposure of a number of horrendous cases 
of infanticides since 2008, to a point where journalists are wondering if this is turning into a 
somber pattern.29 These gloomy numbers reflect the social and economic distress that is 
prevalent in today’s Tajikistan, which especially affects women. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rahmon’s Mothers Day’s speech in 2015 insisted on the importance of the mother described 
as a unique creature “who swings the cradle with one hand and with the other, the planet”. 
Such paternalistic rhetoric conveys the message that women are responsible for the 
perpetuation of the nation through the appropriate upbringing of children as well as through 
the display of proper social behavior, such as the celebration of national values and the 
rejection of foreign influence. Overall, citizens are encouraged to act in conformity with 
national values and according to the President, “there is no greater sin than the betrayal of 
parents and of the Motherland”.30 Yet, the tightening of state control over not only politics 
and religion, but over ways of being in the world on a day-to-day basis increases the 
pressure on citizens, especially women. Eventually, such patronizing practices can only 
foster resentment toward a privileged and commanding political elite.  
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